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Abstract 
 
Contradicting the conventional wisdom of constant factor shares, the portion of national 
income accruing to labor has been trending downward in the last three decades. This 
decline must have contributed to rising inequality as labor income is more evenly distributed 
than capital income. This study contributes to the literature on income inequality by exploring 
the role of globalization in driving the labor share. In particular, we focus on the impacts of 
trade openness and foreign direct investments (FDI) on the labor share. Using country-level 
panel data for 1980–2010, the study finds that trade is a significant and robust determinant 
of labor share. Generally speaking, export depresses while import increases the labor share. 
The impact of FDI, however, is insignificant. These results are similar for both developed and 
developing countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Functional income distribution is at the center of political economy (Ricardo 1817). For 
decades, studies on production functions and macroeconomic dynamics rely on the 
assumption of constant factor shares (Bowley 1920; Kaldor 1957; Gollin 2002). This 
important assumption has recently been questioned after observing a worldwide 
decline in labor share (Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014; Guerriero 2012; Schneider 
2011; Elsby et al. 2013; Rodriguez and Jayadev 2010; Giovannoni 2014). The share 
has been falling in almost all Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) economies (ILO 2013), and has been trending downward in 
developing countries, especially since the early 1990s. Developing Asia, for example, 
experienced a decline of approximately 20%, while the wage share in African countries 
fell by 15% (ILO 2011). 
Studying functional income distribution has important implications for the fight against 
inequality because labor income is more evenly distributed than capital income, which 
tends to accrue to the rich (Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa 2007; Garcia-Penalosa and 
Orgiazzi 2013; Jacobson and Occhino 2012). In his best-selling book, Piketty (2014) 
cited increasing capital income as the major source of rising inequality. Atkinson (2009) 
also pointed out that decreases in the labor share contributed to worsening inequality. 
However, what drives this decline remains an open question for further analysis.  
The decline of labor share coincided with the current wave of globalization beginning  
in the early 1980s.1 Previous studies modelled the impacts of globalization on income 
inequality, for example, Goldberg and Pavnik (2007), Topalova (2007), Wan et al. 
(2007), Xue et al. (2014), and, Chatchai and Pandej (2011). It is thus natural to ask if 
globalization contributes to this eroding share of labor income.  
Against this backdrop, this study aims to estimate the impact of globalization on labor 
share. The research questions are twofold. First, what are the impacts of trade and FDI 
on labor share? Second, how do the effects differ, if any, between developed and 
developing countries?  
This study contributes to existing literature in several ways. First, we distinguish the 
globalization-labor share nexus according to level of development. Differences in the 
structure of trade, labor market, as well as in factor endowment between developing 
countries and their advanced counterparts can result in opposite correlations. If so, the 
impact of the two country groups may offset each other, resulting in insignificant 
estimates when data is pooled.   
Second, we separately estimate the impact of export and import on the labor share. 
While the bargaining framework of Rodrik (1997) suggests a rise in capital share due to 
overall trade, import and export can have different impacts. As our empirical results 
demonstrate, exports depresses labor share, while imports exert the opposite effect. 
Jaumotte and Tytell (2007) also found heterogeneous impacts of import and export 
prices on the labor share. In this study, we utilize export and import share to GDP as 
trade indicators. 
Third, we consider both outward and inward FDI. While inward FDI may affect labor 
share by improving productivity and competition, outward FDI may reduce the 
bargaining power of domestic workers and provide opportunities for capitalists to 
pursue higher return abroad. 
1  For a discussion on different waves of globalization, see Dollar (2005). 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Theoretical Considerations 
There is no established theoretical framework on the effects of globalization on 
functional income distribution. Research on this often cite two possible transmission 
channels: the neoclassical trade theory and the bargaining game framework.  
The first channel, neoclassical trade theory, works through changing relative factor 
price by shifting production towards industries with comparative advantages. The 
workhorse in the traditional trade theory, the Heckscher-Ohlin model and  
Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theorem, predicts that the abundant factor gains when a 
country opens to trade. Thus, developed countries tend to export capital-intensive 
goods, while developing countries tend to export labor-intensive goods. This implies 
that those economies and individuals with the abundant factor can reap higher  
returns under globalization. For example, capital owners in Japan or the United States 
will gain, whereas in People's Republic of China or Brazil, the benefit of international 
trade goes to workers. As a consequence, international trade is expected to squeeze 
labor share in developed countries and increase it in developing counterparts 
(Stockhammer 2013; Giovannoni 2014). 
However, the neoclassical trade model seems unsupported by statistics. The decline of 
labor share has also been observed in developing countries. The theory, in fact, suffers 
from several drawbacks. First, the assumption of factor immobility between countries 
do not reflect the real situation of capital flows across borders, and to some extent, 
even cross-border labor migration (European Commission 2007). Second, workers are 
not homogeneous in terms of skills, as assumed in the trade theory. Skilled labor in 
developing countries may actually gain from globalization (Stockhammer 2009). 
Under the second channel, the bargaining framework (Rodrik 1997; Slaughter 1999), 
the objective of firms and workers is to maximize rents in production under imperfect 
competition. Rent maximization depends on bargaining power of population groups. 
Those with more power in the bargaining game will receive the larger share of the profit 
pie. The bargaining power, on the other hand, depends on a number of factors, such as 
the fixed costs of relocating abroad and the return to factor at home versus in foreign 
locations (Harrison 2005). 
From this perspective, reductions in trade and FDI barriers imply lower fixed costs of 
relocation. Rodrik (1997) argues that freer movement across borders will benefit the 
more mobile factor, namely capital. Because it is easier to relocate capital overseas 
than labor, capital owners are at a favorable position to move their resources to 
destinations with higher returns. On the other hand, cross-border migration makes it 
possible to substitute the domestic supply of labor with imported labor. Consequently, 
demand for domestic workers becomes more elastic, implying a weakening bargaining 
power of workers. This may lead to decreases in wages. Under this setting, 
globalization depresses labor share in both developed and developing countries. 
2.2 Empirical Studies 
2.2.1 Globalization and Labor Share in Developed Countries 
Studies on the globalization-labor share nexus in advanced economies are generally 
supportive of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Using a panel of 18 OECD countries from 
1983 to 2002, Jaumotte and Tytell (2007) found significant impact of globalization on 
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wage share. In particular, an increase in relative export price reduces labor share, 
while an increase in relative import price has the opposite impact. Stockhammer  
(2009) questioned the reliability of their findings. After adding several control variables 
and conducting various specification tests, Stockhammer (2009) concluded that their 
findings suffered from econometric problems. However, globalization is the only 
variable that appears to be robust. 
Similarly, Guscina (2006) examined data from 18 industrial countries from 1960 to 
2000 and found that openness to trade and increasing trade with the South have 
dampened the portion of income accrued to labor. The study employs various 
indicators of globalization: trade share over GDP, trade share with developing 
countries, share of FDI flows over GDP, and ratio of capital flows to GDP. This  
effect became more pronounced after 1985, a rough benchmark for the latest 
globalization wave.  
2.2.2 Globalization and Labor Share in Developing Countries 
The bargaining game framework discussed by Rodrik (1997) is often used to explain 
the distribution of factor incomes in developing countries where the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory lacks explanatory power. Starting with a theoretical model that combines the 
bargaining game framework with the general equilibrium theory, Harrison (2005) 
explored data from more than one hundred countries from 1960 to 2000. Both ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) estimates indicated a negative and 
significant impact of increasing trade openness on the declining labor share. 
Coefficients on FDI, however, were not robust across specifications.  
While these studies utilized de facto measures of globalization, both de jure and de 
facto indicators were employed by Jayadev (2007), who focused on the impact of 
capital mobility on labor share, using data from 80 countries from 1970 to 2001. Capital 
mobility was represented by the capital account openness index in the manner of  
Lee and Jayadev (2003). For trade openness, two measures were considered: the  
ratio of trade taxes to trade sourced from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI)2 and the residual by regressing the trade share on GDP per capita 
and population (in log form), as in Rao (1998). The results were robust for developed 
countries, whereas there was no evidence of the bargaining channel in the developing 
counterparts. The study concluded that heterogeneity among countries in terms  
of economic structure plays an important role in determining the openness-labor  
share linkage. 
Decreuse and Maarek (2015) estimated the impact of FDI on labor share using  
1980–2000 data from 98 developing countries. They deviated from the bargaining 
framework by exploring two direct channels: a positive impact due to a rise in wage 
resulting from increased competition, and, a negative one caused by advanced 
technology advances and the associated improvement in labor productivity. Estimation 
results suggested that inward FDI stock is negatively related to labor share, but 
outward FDI do not have any significant impact. However, the data used in this  
study was problematic. FDI was for the whole economy but labor share was only  
for the manufacturing sector. Given the dominant and continously increasing  
service FDI share in total FDI stock over the period,3 the data mismatch may lead to 
misleading results.  
2  This study did not specify which WDI version was used. 
3  According to UNCTAD’s World Investment Report (2007), in 2005, FDI in manufacturing accounted for 
one third in total FDI stock, as opposed to 61% of FDI in services. For manufacturing, this is a 
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3. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND DATA 
3.1 Model 
Following Guerriero and Sen (2012), Jayadev (2007), our baseline model is  
specified as:  
𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 +
∑𝛾𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  (1) 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑡 denotes labor share in country I at time t and𝑥𝑗 is a set of control variables 
which will be included based on the related literature, uit is a composite error term 
consisting of year fixed effects, country fixed effects as well as a white noise. 
We employ first difference estimation as the second strategy. In fact, fixed effect and 
first difference produce similar estimates if strict exogeneity is satisfied. However, when 
strict exogeneity fails, these two techniques will provide different estimates. In addition, 
first difference can tackle the issue of nonstationarity. Therefore, we introduce first 
difference estimation as a robustness check. We thus modify equation (1) as follows 
∆𝑠𝑙,𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1∆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑖𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽4∆𝑢𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝛾𝑗∆𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
In this case, country fixed-effects have been eliminated. Our 𝜀𝑖𝑡  include year fixed 
effects and a random error term. 
Stockhammer (2009, 2013) and Harrison (2005) also suggested estimation using  
five-year non-overlapping averages. There are two justifications for this choice. First, 
some variables may be relatively constant in the short-run. Second, by smoothing  
out the data over a longer period, we can eliminate autocorrelation and noise. 
Consequently, we also include OLS estimation using five-year non-overlapping data. 
Finally, endogeneity may exist in the baseline model. For example, FDI in labor-
intensive sectors may choose countries with higher labor share. Similarly, countries 
with higher labor share may have lower demand for labor-intensive imports. To address 
this issue of potential reverse causality, we perform two-stage least squares estimation, 
using the first lags of export, import, outward FDI and inward FDI as instruments.  
3.2 Data 
The main source of data is Penn World Table (PWT) version 8.1. Other sources are 
UNCTAD’s FDI Statistics Database for FDI stock share and World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 2015 for manufacturing share and trade share.  
3.2.1 Labor Share 
Labor share is the ratio of total labor compensation over national output. Labor 
compensation includes not only wages and salaries but also workers’ benefits, 
including health insurance, commissions, bonuses, and social security. In principle, it 
should also include labor income for the self-employed. However, this income portion is 
remarkable drop from 41% in 1990, while FDI stock in services has risen by more than 10% in the 
corresponding period. 
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difficult to measure as it represents both returns to labor and returns to capital. Even 
data on total income of the self-employed is missing for many countries.4  
The commonly used labor share statistic reflects compensation to corporate workers 
and regards income of the self-employed as capital income. As a result, labor share is 
underestimated. This problem is more pronounced in developing countries, where 
informal sector accounts for a larger portion of the workforce.5 
To address this problem, Young (1995) suggested derivation of wages of the self-
employed based on individuals’ sector of employment, sex, age, and education. This 
method was demanding as far as data was concerned.  
A more popular approach was developed by Gollin (2002) who recommended three 
different ways of adjustment. The first way was to treat all mixed income as labor 
income. The second was to assume that capital and labor shares in the unincorporated 
sector was the same as those in the corporate sector. Finally, the average wage of the 
self-employed was assumed to equal that of corporate workers.  
PWT data was used in this study for two reasons. First, the labor share was carefully 
adjusted for self-employment. A part of this adjustment was based on Gollin’s (2002) 
suggestion of using mixed income and average wage. As Feenstra et al. (2015) 
pointed out, the “same-average-wage” assumption in Gollin (2002) might well describe 
the situation in developed countries, where the share of employees in total employment 
is approximately from 85% to 95%. However, in developing countries where the share 
is below 50%, this assumption is likely to result in overestimation of the labor share. 
Consequently, Feenstra et al. (2015) recommended one extra method based on the 
share of agriculture in total value-added. The most suitable adjustment for each country 
was chosen based on data availability and comparison of estimated values. 
Second, the coverage of PWT was broad in terms of years and countries. Labor share 
was available for 127 countries over a 60-year period. However, interpolation was used 
to derive much of the pre-1970 data, which were dropped in this study. Our final 
dataset on the labor share covered 1980–2010 with 93 countries, 40 of which are 
advanced economies. 
3.2.2 Globalization Indicators 
Data on trade and FDI were available at different levels of aggregation and forms.6  
A common concern is the choice between de jure and de facto index. De jure 
measures are constructed based on related trade and investment policy tools, for 
example, tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and exchange rate regimes as part of capital 
controls. De facto measures, on the other hand, represents the real figures of trade 
amount or FDI volume.  
This study used de facto measures of openness. De facto measures capture the 
effectiveness of policy enforcement, while de jure indicators only represent instruments 
utilized to achieve a specific policy goal. This effectiveness can change over time even 
if the policy instruments remain unchanged (Kose et al, 2009). De facto measures also 
reflect the actual extent to which an economy is open.  
4  In Guerriero (2012), for example, mixed income data is only available for 60 of 141 countries in the 
study. Most of them are advanced economies. 
5  According to Gindling and Newhouse (2012), more than 50% of total employment in low- and middle-
income economies work outside corporate sectors, compared to only 15% in their high-income 
counterparts. 
6  Yanikkaya (2003) listed over 20 indicators used for trade openness alone. 
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For trade openness, we used the ratio of export and import to GDP. We also included 
the ratios of outward and inward FDI stock to GDP as other indicators of globalization. 
Although FDI flows appear to correspond more symmetrically to trade flows, as Kose  
et al. (2009) suggested, stocks are less volatile and less prone to measurement errors. 
Thus, using stock measures reduce noise in the data (Quinn et al. 2011). As stocks are 
the accumulation of flows across time it can capture de facto degree of openness, the 
core issue we were concerned with.  
3.2.3 Control Variables 
Apart from globalization, technological change is one of the perceived drivers of the 
labor share. If technological progress is capital-augmenting, wage share will decrease. 
Bentolila and Saint Paul (2013) showed that capital-augmented technological progress, 
proxied by total-factor productivity (TFP), has negative and significant impact on labor 
share. There are other indicators of technological progress, for example information 
and communication technologies (ICT) capital stock (Jaumotte and Tytell 2007) and 
capital intensity (Harrison 2005; Stockhammer 2009). We utilized TFP at constant 2005 
prices as reported in PWT. 
Capital intensity was included to capture the extent of factor endowment. The 
relationship between capital intensity and labor share depends on the elasticity of 
substitution (European Commission 2007; Harrison 2005). A fall in capital-labor ratio 
results in lower labor share, if these two inputs are complementary. When the elasticity 
of substitution is low, it is not easy to substitute capital stock by labor, implying lower 
labor share too. On the contrary, labor share will rise when capital intensity falls, if two 
inputs are relatively substitutable. 
Finally, the GDP share of manufacturing was included to capture structural 
transformation or industrialization that affects labor share. Since both agriculture  
and services were relatively more labor-intensive, industrialization may lead to lower  
labor share.  
Table 1 reports summary statistics and defines the variables used.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Labor sharea 1986 55.2 11.6 9.0 86.4 
Inward FDI stock (% of GDP)b  1510 28.1 43.2 0.0 487.6 
Outward FDI stock (% of GDP)b 1310 8.3 37.1 0.0 790.7 
Export (% of GDP)c 1814 38.2 27.8 4.7 230.3 
Import (% of GDP) c 1814 40.6 27.1 0.0 209.4 
Manufacturing share, value-added (% of GDP)d 1580 16.9 6.6 1.3 42.2 
Capital intensity (in log form)e 1961 10.9 1.2 7.3 12.7 
TFP (in log form)f 1783 0.0 0.2 –1.1 0.8 
a Labor share is defined as adjusted labor share.  
b FDI is defined as outward FDI stock/GDP and inward FDI stock/GDP. 
c Trade openness is defined as export value/GDP and import value/GDP.  
d Manufacturing share is defined as manufacturing, value-added as percentage of GDP (in log form). 
e Capital intensity is defined as real capital stock/total employment (in log form). 
f Technological progress is defined as TFP at constant national prices, base year 2005. 
Sources: Penn World Table 8.1, UNCTAD’s FDI Statistics, and World Development Indicators 2015. 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the estimation result of the baseline model (1).7 Year dummies were 
included in all equations. Four findings stand out.  
Table 2: Globalization and Labor Share, All Countries 
Variables 
Labor Sharea 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effect Random Effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Export –0.226*** –0.259** –0.197* –0.167** –0.244*** –0.173*** –0.165** –0.239*** –0.175*** 
 (0.081) (0.102) (0.112) (0.072) (0.071) (0.064) (0.068) (0.067) (0.061) 
Import 0.155* 0.196** 0.155 0.066 0.109* 0.063 0.071 0.115* 0.069 
 (0.082) (0.089) (0.099) (0.066) (0.064) (0.059) (0.062) (0.060) (0.056) 
Outward FDIb  0.037* 0.039*  0.009 0.008*  0.009 0.008* 
  (0.019) (0.020)  (0.006) (0.005)  (0.006) (0.005) 
Inward FDIb  –0.026 –0.030  –0.008 –0.004  –0.008 –0.004 
  (0.025) (0.027)  (0.015) (0.014)  (0.014) (0.014) 
Capital 
intensity 
  0.077   1.438   1.176 
  (1.541)   (4.232)   (2.736) 
TFP   –5.260   –13.341***   –13.096*** 
  (6.318)   (3.206)   (2.854) 
Industry 
sharec 
  0.131   –0.220*   –0.211* 
  (0.249)   (0.131)   (0.119) 
Observations 1,814 1,239 967 1,814 1,239 967 1,814 1,239 967 
R-squared 0.154 0.140 0.108 0.887 0.902 0.938    
a Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b FDI and trade variables are measured as percentage of GDP. 
c Industry share is defined as the share of manufacturing value-added over GDP. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
First, the impact of export and import on labor share were mixed. Export depressed 
labor share and its impact was statistically significant. A percentage point increase in 
export share resulted in approximately 0.17% to 0.26% decrease in labor share. This 
effect could be caused by the improvement of productivity following exports or the more 
capital-intensive export structure.  
Import, on the other hand, increased labor share. The coefficient, however, was not 
significant in half of the estimated equations. The opposite impact on import and export 
were interesting and deserve further investigation, since previous studies only focused 
on the overall impact of trade.8  
Second, outward FDI had a positive but insignificant impact on labor share, while the 
coefficients of inward FDI had the opposite sign. This result is similar to Harrison 
(2005), who suggested inward FDI act as a proxy for the ease with which investment 
come and leave a country.  
Third, technology proxied by TFP had a negative and significant impact on labor share, 
confirming that technology is capital-biased. This finding was consistent with Harrison 
(2005), Jaumotte and Tytell (2007), Guscina (2006).  
Fourth, the impact of capital intensity and structural transformation were insignificant. 
7  Hausman test favors random effects specification. 
8  The only exception to this is Jaumotte and Tytell (2007). However, their study focused on developed 
nations. 
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One concern was that the impact of globalization on factor shares may differ at 
different stages of development. Therefore, we estimated model (1) separately for 
developed and developing countries. The income classification is based on World 
Development Indicators 2015.  
Several findings are worth mentioning (Table 3 reports the regression results). First, 
the signs of coefficients for globalization variables were similar in both groups. Second, 
the impact of trade was more pronounced in developed countries, where both export 
and import are significant and larger in magnitude. Third, the opposite and significant 
impacts of capital intensity between the two groups was notable. 
In developed countries, the impact of capital intensity is positive and significant, 
suggesting a low substitutability between labor and capital. This is consistent with 
Rowthorn (1999), Antras (2004), and Krusell et al. (2000) who found that that the 
elasticity of substitution was well below one in advanced economies.  
In developing countries, where low-skilled workers account for a significant proportion, 
capital intensity was negatively correlated with labor share. Unlike with skilled labor, 
capital and unskilled workers were likely to be substitutes. Thus, a relative increase in 
capital stock may result in lower labor demand, rendering a decrease in the labor 
share. Moreover, technological progress in developing countries tend to be labor-
augmenting in nature given their early stage of development (Acemoglu 2003). In this 
case, the elasticity of substitution was larger than one. 
Table 3: Globalization and Labor Share, by Income Group 
Variable 
Labor Sharea 
Developed Countries Developing Countries 
Pooled OLS FE RE Pooled OLS FE RE 
Export –0.273** –0.320*** –0.327*** –0.232* –0.156*** –0.163*** 
 
(0.123) (0.069) (0.064) (0.130) (0.047) (0.043) 
Import 0.252* 0.226*** 0.279*** 0.191*** 0.015 0.031 
 
(0.147) (0.065) (0.084) (0.055) (0.072) (0.065) 
Outward FDIb 0.051 –0.007 0.008 0.033** 0.009 0.010 
 
(0.109) (0.036) (0.071) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) 
Inward FDIb –0.092* –0.028 –0.052** –0.014 –0.001 –0.001 
 
(0.047) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022) (0.014) (0.013) 
Capital intensity 10.038*** 14.823*** 9.883*** –6.773*** –4.298 –4.924*** 
 
(2.567) (4.596) (3.127) (1.631) (3.182) (1.707) 
TFP –20.178*** –8.140* –11.051** –16.171*** –10.963*** –10.741*** 
 
(6.883) (4.437) (4.812) (4.146) (3.093) (2.673) 
Industry sharec 0.129 –0.113 –0.025 –0.018 –0.131 –0.120 
 
(0.200) (0.180) (0.174) (0.162) (0.098) (0.085) 
Observations 446 446 446 513 513 513 
R-squared 0.413 0.933 
 
0.511 0.951 
 a Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b FDI and trade variables are measured as percentage of GDP. 
c Industry share is defined as the share of manufacturing value-added over GDP. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4 presents estimation results in first differences as shown by equation (2). The 
results were similar to those reported in Table 3, except for coefficients on FDI which 
turned out to be negative, though insignificant in all specifications. Regressions on 
developed countries yielded more consistent results.  
Table 4: Globalization and Labor Share, First Difference Equation 
Variables 
ΔLabor Shareab 
(1)e (2)e (3)e (4)f (5)f 
ΔExport –0.192*** –0.177*** –0.130*** –0.268*** –0.085** 
 
(0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.026) (0.038) 
ΔImport 0.087*** 0.066* 0.031 0.198*** –0.028 
 
(0.028) (0.036) (0.047) (0.032) (0.048) 
ΔOutward FDIc 
 
–0.003 –0.003** –0.008 –0.003** 
  
(0.002) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) 
ΔInward FDIc 
 
–0.006 –0.009 –0.010 –0.015 
  
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
ΔCapital intensity 
  
–4.210 –5.121 –6.216*** 
   
(2.845) (4.060) (2.103) 
ΔTFP 
  
–4.305 –15.028*** –4.388 
   
(2.700) (3.738) (3.041) 
ΔIndustry shared 
  
–0.271*** –0.502** –0.274*** 
   
(0.097) (0.198) (0.089) 
Observations 1,714 1,155 898 417 474 
R-squared 0.154 0.170 0.180 0.348 0.094 
a Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b Year dummies are included.  
c FDI and trade variables are measured as percentage of GDP. 
d Industry share is defined as the share of manufacturing value-added over GDP. 
e Columns (1) to (3) report results for the whole sample.  
f Columns (4) and (5) report results for developed countries and developing countries, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
As argued earlier, it is useful to average data over a number of years and repeat  
the above estimations. Table 5 reports the results of estimating (1) using five-year 
averages for all variables. Although the sample size dropped considerably, the results 
were consistent with those presented in Tables 3 and 4. For example, export was a 
robust determinant of labor share. The estimated coefficient of import was positive and 
significant in most cases. Inward FDI also exerted negative impact on labor share, 
while outward FDI exerted positive impact, although both coefficients were not stable.  
Lastly, 2SLS estimation was performed to account for endogeneity. Table 6 shows the 
results, which were broadly consistent with previous results. 
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Table 5: Globalization and Labor Share, Using Five-Year  
Non-Overlapping Average Data 
Variables 
Labor Shareab 
(1)e (2)e (3)e (4)f (5)f 
Export –0.235*** –0.269** –0.218* –0.267 –0.255* 
 
(0.078) (0.103) (0.111) (0.164) (0.144) 
Import 0.169** 0.212** 0.182* 0.259 0.198*** 
 
(0.076) (0.090) (0.096) (0.187) (0.065) 
Outward FDIc 
 
0.045* 0.048* 0.103 0.039** 
  
(0.024) (0.026) (0.108) (0.016) 
Inward FDIc 
 
–0.040* –0.038 –0.083* –0.016 
  
(0.024) (0.027) (0.046) (0.020) 
Capital intensity 
 
0.447 8.069** –6.730*** 
   
(1.498) (3.325) (1.561) 
TFP 
  
–5.543 –14.928 –13.281*** 
   
(6.553) (9.430) (3.852) 
Industry shared 
  
0.169 0.251 0.021 
   
(0.239) (0.233) (0.184) 
Observations 505 388 315 147 166 
R-squared 0.087 0.104 0.094 0.313 0.475 
a Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b Country dummies are included.  
c FDI and trade variables are measured as percentage of GDP. 
d Industry share is defined as the share of manufacturing value-added over GDP. 
e Columns (1) to (3) report results for the whole sample.  
f Columns (4) and (5) report results for developed countries and developing countries, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 6: Globalization and Labor Share of Income, 2SLS Estimation 
Variables 
Labor Shareab 
(1)e (2)e (3)e (4)f (5)f 
Export –0.183*** –0.311*** –0.202*** –0.369*** –0.194*** 
 
(0.023) (0.029) (0.032) (0.050) (0.045) 
Import 0.078*** 0.127*** 0.079** 0.289*** 0.000 
 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.032) (0.058) (0.036) 
Outward FDIc 
 
0.009* 0.008* 0.008 0.011** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.023) (0.005) 
Inward FDIc 
 
–0.008 –0.004 –0.031*** –0.000 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) 
Capital intensity 
  
1.880** 15.843*** –3.922*** 
   
(0.919) (1.396) (1.237) 
TFP 
  
–13.805*** –6.139*** –11.454*** 
   
(1.087) (1.844) (1.399) 
Industry shared 
  
–0.230*** –0.146* –0.087 
   
(0.055) (0.086) (0.076) 
Observations 1,714 1,155 908 423 478 
a Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b Country dummies are included.  
c FDI and trade variables are measured as percentage of GDP. 
d Industry share is defined as the share of manufacturing value-added over GDP. 
e Columns (1) to (3) report results for the whole sample.  
f Columns (4) and (5) report results for developed countries and developing countries, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
This study set out to investigate the impacts of globalization on labor share, using  
data from 87 countries over a 31-year period from 1980 to 2010. These were its  
three major findings. 
First, export was an important and statistically significant factor driving the decline of 
labor share over the last three decades. The effects differed between developed and 
developing countries. The magnitude was larger for advanced economies.  
Second, import exerted positive impact on the labor share, although the significance 
varied across models.  
Third, there was little empirical evidence on FDI’s influence on labor share. 
The study implies that globalization is a driving factor behind income inequality, as it is 
negatively correlated with the labor share. Therefore, globalization, especially trade 
channel, deserves serious consideration from policy makers dealing with declining  
labor share. While increasing trade is a nonreversible trend as a stimulus for growth, 
remedies to improve labor market conditions, better investment in education and 
training to upgrade workers’ skills would be possible options to pursue. 
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